Showing posts with label Current Events. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Current Events. Show all posts

Tuesday, 21 September 2010

Link: "A dinner as bitter as bile" @ http://blogs.euobserver.com/persson/

I found this blog post and couldn't let it go by. It was posted by Matt Persson, a regular contributor with his own blog at euobserver.com. I am posting it here for fear that it may be erazed in the future. It is a transcript from a homonimous article of Le Monde. If, as according to the article it is a reliable account of what went on, then one should be really concerned... On the other hand, Berlusconi's contributions are as ridiculous at the EU level as anywhere else!

Tuesday, 18 May 2010

It's so annoying I'm starting to get depressed...

I feel for European Integration, particularly the economic part of it. It never has any respite. It is constantly attacked from every corner. Today the Euro is attacked for being too weak as a result of the fiscal crisis. Yesterday it was accused of threatening European competitiveness because monetary policy was too strict thus causing exchange rates between the Dollar and the Euro to be too high. Before that the problem was that European currencies fluctuated too much among themselves, thus creating comercial tensions between the EU's member states. We are sklerotic, we are Byzantine and we are lazy. We don't innovate and we are too rigid. Now we are too flexible and soon we'll be extinct. It seems that the only time we were happy was during the "30 glorious" years after WWII. How ridiculous that support for Europe is dependent on economic growth. This crisis will pass as all others have and as the next ones will. The world will not fall apart, and the Eurozone won't desintegrate. The European Dream will survive, but nay sayers will always find an excuse to say that it is falling apart.

It's going to be painful,but European economies will pull through. Commentators are talking as if this was the first time we had to tighten our belts... Portugal had to be bailed out by the IMF in the 1980s. My country has a lot of problems, but we pulled through. There's no reason Greece, or any other country, won't. We'll fix our houses; Germany, France, the Benelux, Sweden and Finland will make sure of this. In some years we'll be fine. The Euro will be close to parity with the USA, and eventually inflation will calm down. We might even experience a little bit of an export led boom, and hopefully the weight of fiscal pressures will revive budget rationalisations about defence expenditure. Not withstanding my ideosincracies though, Gideon Rachman is depressed... and his is a pretty contagious sort of depression. On the other hand, there's always Liberation's Jean Quatremer, who at least is slightly more realistic about the cyclical nature of this pessimism. Charles Wyplosz also offers some comfort in this article from Bloomberg.

Sunday, 9 May 2010

The European Commission can Contract Debt on behalf of the whole of the EU!!

I am godsmacked by my own ignorance! I had no idea about this but apparently the European Commission has been able to contract debt on behalf of all of its member states since 1988. This is heavily regulated, but has been brought forward as a reform channel now that the EU needs to set up an emergency fund to calm down the markets.

I came across it on this article by Mr Anthony Barber from the FT.

After researching a bit, these are the relevant sources that I found:

The relevant press release, which among other things gives info on the debt:

"The EC has carried out three euro bond issues since last year to finance a first instalment of €2 billion for Hungary (disbursed early December 2008), a second instalment also to Hungary and also of €2 billion (disbursed late March) as well as a first instalment of €1 billion to Latvia (paid in February). The last issue, placed on 17 March and due on 7 November 2014 (5-year maturity), was priced 3.25%."(implemented to help Hungary and Latvia).

Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 reforming the original 1988 regulation, forbiding its application to the Eurozone countries but allowing its use to non €zone countries. Also extending the fund to 25 Billion.

The original Council Regulation (EEC) No 1969/88 of 24 June 1988 establishing a single facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments.

More details on the implications soon to come, but for the time being I can think of this:

If the finance ministers intend to use this debt facility as a channel for dealing with and calming debt markets, then they will face 1 obvious hurdle and 2 potential problems. The obvious problem is that the regulation is very clear. This debt facility only applies to NON EUROZONE countries. At the very least they will have to pass another regulation by the end of the night in order to get it to also apply to Eurozone countries. Then there's the fact that I haven't et checked whether there's anything written about it in the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice or Lisbon treaty, that also specifies the scope of this regulation. If so it is an enormous problem, tantamount to requiring EU constitutional reform, which takes ages. Finally it is possible that the ECB may play a role in this and as such it would be interesting to see what obstacles it would pose to the expansion of this subreptitious European Monetary/Debt Fund.

Thursday, 6 May 2010

Debt markets in the next two weeks

This article is extremely insightful. However I must disagree with the analogy between Greece and Bear Stearns. This is inappropriate because Greece is getting bailed out, Bear Stearns wasn’t. If anything Greece should be compared to Morgan Stanley who was bailed out.

Moreover, the contagion to Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy is similar but on a much smaller scale. When Bear Stern filed for bankruptcy, the devastation was enormous because suddenly reputation was worthless. Therefore markets were unable to know who was in a good financial position and who wasn’t. Bad money crowded out good money which almost brought trading to a halt. In the present situation however markets know that Northern Europe’s credit is good. The doubt is as to whether all of Southern Europe is worse off than its northern neighbours and if so by how much.

Thus reactions are probably extremely exaggerated. Greece cooked its books for some years until it was impossible to hide the mess any longer. Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy for all we know have been honest in their reporting. Now of course no one is in a great place right now. Portugal has a private debt to GDP ration above 200% and requires some very fundamental changes in the way its economy works. Spain is going through 20% unemployment rates. Ireland has the EU’s largest deficit this year. So the fundamentals are not quite there, and in the long run it is both predictable and good that the financial markets are putting some pressure on these countries to fix their economies.

I would venture the guess that asymmetries of information between the governments and their lenders are causing the latter to exaggerate the extent of risk that they are exposed to. They are also increasing the effect of rumours and gossip in trading, such as Morgan Stanley's Joachim Fels' argument that the Euro-area is at risk. If this is the case, then things should either get much better or much worse for Portugal, Spain and Italy in the next 2 weeks. On May 12 data pertaining to the first quarter of 2010 about the national accounts of Portugal and the preliminary Italian and Spanish GDP values will be published. On May 19, the Spanish national accounts data will be published and the next day Italy will publish its latest industrial turnover figures.

The dissemination of this information should decrease the asymmetries of information and give a better idea of how solvent these countries are. Of course whether the new data will be favourable to the reporting nations is completely unknown. If it is, sovereign debt yields should shrink. If isn’t, then there might be yet another run on their debts and on the Euro. If the latter occurs, I would expect the ECB to start purchasing national debt on the secondary market in order to limit contagion. This should lower the prices of national debt, while maintaining some institutional pressure on EU member states to reform. All that the ECB has to do is to warn that in the absence of reform it will dump suspicious sovereign debt on the markets, causing a fairly predictable increase in their price.

Until then the markets should continue to behave a bit nervously, at least for another week, unless something new happens, like some oil shock, a or some freak revolution in Greece. Moreover, they will probably go a bit bonkers with the fact that there wont be a clear cut majority in Westminster. The Greek parliament could fail to approve EU/IMF assistance, or the upcoming summit of the council leaders could be either very successful or very unsuccessful in drafting plans for dealing with fiscal problems and reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (Hopefully they'll come up with decent plans for the EMF rather than for an actual European rating agency). Finally some rating agency might downgrade one of these countries yet again. What do you think?

Monday, 26 April 2010

Upcoming EU Debates and Reforms

I'm going to do something everyone loves and no one is good at. I'm going to try to predict what the next big debates in the EU will be given what little information we have now. My logic is that future reform will follow the same path as previously and as such will be economic and intergovernmental crisis driven, with a bit of a functional institutionalist steering. I propose that two main policy areas will be discussed and that one major institutional issue will be raised. The first two refer to economic governance and to defence. The latter reffers to the possibility of a dual presidency of EU institutions under the same president.

1) POLICIES

a)Economic Governance: This is the perennial EU reform, caused by some ongoing crisis, and typically is path dependent, in that it is the latest step in European economic integration. Looking back at the Greek crisis which has spawned it, one is faced with the fact that this was almost inevitable. The geographical proximity of European countries and the transaction and transportation costs of the mid 20th century tie European countries to each other through trade, despite Political and security fears. These in turn motivate the ECSC(1951) and the CAP(1960), which then lead to the Common market. This increased level of integration increases intra-European trade, which leaves national producers more exposed to competition.unable to restrict access, national governments turn to artificially increasing competitiveness through exchange rate manipulation. This then causes a number of attempts from high productivity countries to control the others. Alternatively in order to avoid a race to the bottom in exchange rates countries decide to cooperate and coordinate their exchange rates. Independently of the mechanism, increased trade brings the need to coordinate exchange rates and so in 1979 is born the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Incidentally the main lines of EMU are first proposed a decade earlier in the Werner Report of 1969. From this and the subsequent imperfect agreements it is only a matter of time before those imperfections are made evident by speculative attacks. This, supported by enlargement, the profits that it brings and the impetus it gives to further integration and the countries adapt their interactive institutional framework, perfect the common market into the Single Market and inevitably implement the Euro. However this is still an imperfect setting and requires fiscal integration and delegation to give the monetary union more credibility and shield the member states from speculative attacks.

b)Defence: This is the latest in a number of articles which seem to me as though they indicate a certain willingness to move towards a much more integrated defence system for the EU. First I noticed Italy had been pushing for this (here's some more info), then obviously so did France, (and France again), as well as Germany (and again here). It seems natural. The USA is repositioning itself in light of the emergent powers in the East, looking at India and China as the next big partners/opponents in the geopolitical scene. It is also in decadence (not the one that makes your country disappear, but the one that makes it close a couple of military bases around the world and rethink cowboying around the world in the future.). So it must make some savings. Russia wont invade Europe, despite CEECs fears. Energetic disputes are mostly regional beyond the interest and influence of the USA. At the same the EU is very stable within itself, so the USA don't need to worry about developments here. It's not just that we are too many to deal with. Obama does not come to Europe because he doesn't need to.Thus the USA start pushing for a NATO which is less dependent on their own expenditure and ask us Europeans to share the bill. I don't like war and war-related business but this is an argument I have some difficulty arguing against.

However there is a more fundamental reason for the EU to integrate it's military organisations better, Economies of scale. Basically, as this article argues, and as should be apparent to anyone aware of the EU's non super power role, we spend almost 9 times as much as the Chinese in the military yet we get absolutely no value for money. The extent to which there must be duplication of efforts must be ridiculous for a block of countries who will never fight against each other again. Plus if we all get together, we are bigger, and as economics tells us, bigger markets bring higher levels of specialization which in turn creates higher efficiencies. This is a typical case of being able to get much much more for the same amount of money. Plus if integration in the defence sector takes place, the European defence market becomes a monopsony of procurement with all the advantages that creates for bargaining power for the EU and for all the specialization it creates in the supply side. The obvious downside to this is that we'll create a bigger and newer interest group with more nefarious interests. I mean the last thing we want is a militaristic Europe 100 years after the first world war. So maybe it should be so that this further step in defence integration should follow fiscal integration thus allowing the EU to buy a veto in the administration of war related businesses. In this sense the Germans and the French could sell their shares in the EADS to the EU. Either way something ought to be done to at least try to prevent this sort of development from taking place. After all, it would be a pity to have to continue to follow the USA's initiative. Wouldn't it be amazing if the next internet-like invention came from Europe rather than the USA? (and yes I know the first version of the web came from CERN...).

I don't know how long all of this will take, but it shouldn't be much longer. How long will largely depend on the UK and on the next period of persistent economic growth. The UK is the EU's largest spender on defence. Without it France would have to prop Germany up more than what it might like to. The UK would provide the necessary tie breaker. Finally in order to go through this process it is necessary to have two things: Democratic support and the economic resources to pay for it, so getting out of the crisis would help. It seems to me that the momentum is there. All that's missing is an opportunity.

2)Dual Presidency

Here and here are some discussions of the possibility and implications of merging the roles of the Council and of the Commission presidents. On the face of it, it is not a particularly bad idea. It would decrease the number of Mr/Mme Europe, which seems to have become a major embarrassment for post-Lisbon EU. But is it really such a good idea?

I am on the fence on this. I think that there's that argument in favour of it, but are the roles really compatible? The only example of this is the present situation of Lady Ashton. She's a servant to two masters: The commission of which she is a vice president and commissioner for foreign affairs, and the Council of which she is the president of the committee for foreign affairs and defence and security. How is she handling it? Well it's still a bit early to tell, but she's struggling. The problem to me seems to be that the Commission is an executive body, who is fairly political, and follows or leads the parliament, which is also political. The council however is intergovernmental. Might there be some conflict of interests? Not forcefully and actually this position could actually help put an end to the rivalry between the two institutions. But it would have to be well done... Whoever would be in charge would have to have a lot of staff. Though I would add that in good truth it seems to me as though the best arrangement would be the one where all council "committees" are modeled after the Commissariates and the European Parliament's committees so that the council's meetings are all presided over by the relavant comissioner. Finally, I do agree that at one point or another, the concentration of power will be such that the president of the EU position should either be made to be directly elected or so that the relevant politician must be a member of the lists of the majority party in the European parliament. Both would have political legitimacy, but the latter would do so with added simplicity. It would only require the addition of a small number of articles redefining the role of the president of the commission as closer to the role of the prime minister of a federation (say Merkel or the Prime minister of Canada, India or Australia), to ensure that the candidates would be apparent to everyone, thus forcing him/her to actively campaign. The fear here is that if there is no such transparency incentive, then we may end up with no apparent leader during the campaign, leading to the president being chosen ex-post in the corridors rather than ex-ante or during the voting, as is supposed to be the case.

So what do you think?

Monday, 12 October 2009

Health Insurance Undersupply

So this is what I had in mind when I said that the purely privatised system of the USA is idiotic.
Once again remember the insurance premium function.
P = (1+a)Lp, where:
a= administrative fee
L=Loss incured when insured event takes place (ie: cost of medical treatment)
p= Probability of insured event occurring
In this case p=1 and therefore there is no incentive for the insurer to accept such a cost, which would imply that the insurance company would charge an insurance premium that would be more costly that the treatment (given that it would charge an administrative fee as well as a margin of profit in the insurance premium). Fully private sector markets are, at least for the time being as idiotic an idea as fully publicly owned markets.

Monday, 13 July 2009

The Lisbon Treaty, National Politics and the potential backlash

The Lisbon treaty is an annoying little monster which may be messing around the normal path of domestic politics... This is the case in the Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland and the UK. In the latter, this may be particularly strong. I'm not sure about this and it is only a hunch. However, if only on the surface of it, the story takes turns which seem to plot to make me believe I am right. Here's what we know:

If Gordon Brown had called an election just around the time he came to power, he would have probably won it. At least so everyone said in the summer of 2007. Certainly he would have had a better shot at it than what it seems he will in june 2010. He was deemed as politically unable for not having done so. I really ought to know more about British politics, but I think that the Lisbon treaty might have had something to do with it. Could it have been that Brown feared having to address the issue during the election and that that would have exposed the issue and made it more salient raising even more problems for the EU? Could it have been the looming financial crisis which kept on growing? Could it have been the bad polls? its hard to say... It also hard to understand why no one has yet made a decent leadership challenge. Really Brown is a fairly lame duck prime minister. Many things would change if the Tories came to power, though may be not as many as people would want to. Anyway, may be I am not cynical enough, but one thing I do suspect would happen would be a referendum on the Lisbon treaty, which if the media and the last European elections are at all representative would result in the reversal of the British position on the Treaty. This would make a mess for everybody. Who is holding the boat for labour? I believe it is Peter Mandelson, who was a EU trade commissioner and is just about the only person aside from Miliband with a decent knowledge of politics and of the influence of the EU, and most, likely no significant ambition for the premiership. Could he be protecting Brown in order to protect the EU treaty, or could I have the causation all wrong, and despite rivalries, he is protecting Brown in order to aid himself and as a result that protects the EU treaty. Its difficult to untangle these causalities, but the matter of the fact is that at this stage the UK is an extremely important player.

Nonetheless, I must say that if Ireland rejects the Lisbon Treaty for a second time there really isn’t any precedent to throw around. Normally countries and treaties get a second chance, but not a third. It is either unnecessary (because their vote does not stop others from moving forward: Norway, Sweden, Denmark) or undesired (because national politicians refuse to call a second referendum: France potentially the Netherlands too). There's never been talk of a third referendum. Not even now. The idea is that Ireland will pass the referendum. There is no plan B.

So now we know when Ireland will hold its second referendum: 2 October 2009. In the most optimistic of scenarios, Ireland approves the treaty, the Czechs and the Poles deposit their treaties in Rome sometime before the British election is held and then no one cares any longer about what happens to Gordon Brown. But what if either or all of these 3 things happen:

1)What if the Poles decide to delay the deposition of the treaty?

2) What if the Czechs decide to delay the deposition of the treaty?

3) What if after the treaty is passed in Ireland, the House of Commons withdraws support from Brown and the election does not happen in June 2010, but in January? What if everyone else does everything right, but Brown is kicked out too early?

If any of these things happen, on retourne à la case zero as the French say...And here is where it gets interesting. Imagine that either one of these countries fails to ratify the treaty and effective puts an end to the process, with 5 years waisted in meetings, votes and referenda and no advancement made... Can you imagine the backlash? Whoever makes a mess out of this won't get a thing from the other countries, particularly from France. the one who has a better chance is Ireland, but still there, if the treaty fail, Sarkozy is going to beat the Taioseach into a gruesome rotten peach for not campaigning better. It won't be pretty. If it's one of the two Eastern European countries, they will be so heavily pounded they will be sorry for joining the EU... The same applies for England who might actually decide to do that, under Cameron.

So what happens then? European academics like to say that countries join because of each other. The UK joined because the EEC(read France and Germany) was growing faster. This made Ireland and Denmark join too, because they were heavily dependent on the UK for trade. This coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union also incentivised the rest of Scandinavia to join in. Would Denmark and Ireland leave if the UK left and become simple members of EEA, like Switzerland and Norway? Would Sweden and Finland also leave?

que sera sera

Friday, 26 June 2009

Iran until now

There are a lot of interesting things about the ongoing turmoil in Iran.
Firstly, it is amazing to see that whether you are French, Czech, Hungarian, Portuguese, Spanish, Iranian, Russian or Chinese, it does not matter. Everybody wants to have money, live confortably, and anything can trigger unrest. We do not want to be literate or numerate. We don't naturally crave for philosophy or politics. We want to live fairly happily and hopefully for as long as we can. Skills are only useful as a means to an end. Double digit inflation is not hyperinflation, but it still stinks! Lagging economic growth is not just a measure of some abstract concept and mathematical creation. It is indeed a useful tool to measure welbeing.
Secondly it is moving to see the lengths to which Iranians are willing to go to express their discontent. I wasn't there, but I dont remmember chinese citizens charging against the police. Check the Huffington Post.
Thirdly, some Political Economy.
Who are the Veto players?
Khamenei The Supreme Leader), the council of the wise men, the Revolutionary Guard and the Police. Also at this stage the opposition leader, given the amount of informal support also seems to have become a veto player. Informally, I suppose one may consider the parliament (though lightly so), but more importantly, (Urban) the merchants from the bazars, the middle class educated students, the university professors, and (Rural) the poor, and the uneducated, and the religious establishment.
What is the political system like? Centralised or decentralised? Likely the first... not sure
What about the welfare state? I would suppose that health care is provided by the state, in a rather poor manner, given corruption, and the toll taken on the budget by international sanctions. Pensions outside the public sector must be fairly inexistent. The same must apply to unemployment benefits. Education however seems to be rather good, from what I hear. That seems to be one of the reasons ppl go on the streets. They have all these skills and nobody lets them use them for anything, because the elite care little about the economy.
Fourthly it has to do with the nature and the organisation of the protests.
Reza Aslan on the daily show, with Jon Stewart proposed that both sides (Ahmadinejah and Mousavi) know how to dance this tango, because they were the ones dancing it during the Islamic Revolution. The idea is that this is kind of the same as what happened then, but now the players know what's goind on, where as then they were feeling the field. Aslan proposes that the protestors are going to alternate between taking to the streets and mourning for their deads, like they did in the past. And that in each period of mourning they organise better. It will be interesting to see whether this is the case. Either way, for our short term attention span western society it will probably take too long.
Fifthly, there are signs that some of the religious leaders in the council are trying to remove Khamenei. I cant come accross his name... anyway, 3 things seem possible.
  1. Either they remove Khamenei
  2. Either there's a Tienamen like bloodbath
  3. Or there's a government of unity
1 Seems unlikely, unless Mousavi is able to get the support of the army and the other religious clerics or that the opposition organises into militias that can fight at first the basij and then the police. For this they need guns, which unless they take them from the police, it seems unlikely that it will work. 3 seems unpractical as the interests of Mousavi and Ahmadinejah may not intersect. Then again it is possible that they do and that Mousavi is just leveraging a return to politics. Its hard to tell, though he seems too arty and sophisticated for Ahmadinejah's rhetoric and brutish style. The only thing stopping 2 from happening is the fact that the opposition may be too large. If they go in with tanks it may lead to a face off which could lead the army to join the ranks of the protestors and that the ball game. What if instead of one guy sanding up to a tank, 1 million or a counple of thousands do at once and peacefully? From what I hear, Iran did something similar to that during the revolution, putting flowers in the canon of guns.
So in conclusion: 1 is logistically impossible, due to the lack of guns. It is also difficult due to the existence of the revolutionary guard. However, if the system does not change too much and they are left with their percs it is possible to get to that. A changing flied bu similar crap kind of scenario. The worst case however, would involve the army breaking ranks with the clerics or breaking up into opposing camps some of which might oppose the revolutionary guard and the rest of the army which has not changed allegiances.
2 could actually serve as a catalist for the fall of the regime. This would depend on the determination of the iranian ppl and on the number of times the military are willing to go in and kill ppl.
3 is no good because a unity government without unity or at least equality does not work. Mugabe and Tsvangirai taught us that.
Lastly, and on a lighter note, this has been a rather voyeuristic experience for me. The access to information and footage is just unbelievable. There's more now, without a large press presence, then ever before. I guess the opportunity cost of not sending the press has become really too high with youtube, and "viewer"(more like citizens) generated content. Also, media truly is changing. It seems like it is turning into more of a comentary than a matter of obtaining facts. This is not good, because the press then retrenches itself in a subjective field, and distances itself even more from factual reporting. Also, it's lazy! There's something to be said about the reporter having been present in the midst of the events. "...and now just posted on youtube, in what seems to be a large street, we have a large number of individuals, screaming loudly at what seems to be the police, for some important reason." Where is it? why is it there? What moves the ppl protesting? is it just a bandwagon effect. Are they behaving like a herd? or do they identify some cause for the existing malaise which they must voice. Is it the election? the economy? the lack of freedom?
...
Oh and is the rest of the region saying?
BTW: The media was already tiring of covering the protests. Now that Michael Jackson died, I wonder whether the coverage is not going to disappear altogether. After all it's not like there are that many journalists in the field...