Friday 26 February 2010

MEP Nigel Farage and his complaints

Here's Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP in the European Parliament. For more on him, check wikipedia and this article.

As the following clips show, Mr Farage has decent points, but his cynical and personal rhetoric typical of the Westminster Parliament, does not work so well in a sensitive Europe. Where as in the UK that rhetoric is acceptable, and normal, in Europe it becomes offensive and is unacceptable. He has good points, but wouldn't they be better made if they were put according to the rules of the game everyone else is playing?

Sarkozy, Lisbon Treaty, Van Rompuy and Lady Ashton, Van Rompuy and No apologies to Van Rompuy

On another note, I feel sorry for the members of the European parliament who can't speak either French, English or German, but still try. They ought to make better use of the translators. The bulgarian lady who talks about "popo" is just sad...

So what do you think about the Lisbon treaty? Should there have been a referendum? Was it worth having it? Was it possible to come up with a better treaty, and if so which one?

Thursday 25 February 2010

Government run Ponzi Schemes - Call the IMF!!

So, aside from the brief and recent comment posted yesterday, I haven't written much lately, which is good. It means I have a life. :) However, I think I ought to write something about this whole Greek mess, so as to at least have a reminder of these troubling times for the future. I have five comments about this mess:

First, why on earth is any country allowed to finance the payment of debt itself with more debt? Greece is (today) struggling to pay its debts, so it borrows to pay the debts. Why do markets even lend it the money, given the rather poor growth prospects that Greece is faced with?... It's likely that they have lent some money to Greece at lower interests in the past which now require more lending to get paid. Therefore the idea is that high interest yielding debts pay for low yielding debts. As long as lenders believe that Greece will pay, they keep on lending. So the risk really is to get to a point where Greece loses credibility, because then it will no longer be able to borrow. (this is a bit messy...). As a friend of mine reminded me, this cannot technically qualify as a Ponzi Scheme, because there are no asymmetries of information as the people purchasing Greek bonds are aware of the state of Greek finances and the implications. Indeed it is possible that the Greek government might be the one being defrauded…

Secondly, it is interesting to see the aggressive comments coming out of Greece, about German WWII reparation payments and about Anglo-Saxon media and financial conspiracies... It’s evident that the first two are political manoeuvres to confuse the electorate and shift the blame from the present government to other people. Nonetheless, I must say that the financial conspiracy does carry some weight. I’m not saying that there was any wrong doing. I’m just saying that there is enough evidence to make me believe that it would have been interesting to investigate whether there was collusion between the major lenders to Greece, the last time that it issued its debt. This idea is motivated by the fact that someone recently brought to my attention the fact that although the German bund spreads on Greek debt went up massively the last time they issued debt, the demand for it was massive. This would imply that lenders had estimated an increase in the risk of Greek defaults, but still found them to be attractive enough to want to purchase them. Because the Greek government really needed the money, its demand was rather flat, and inelastic. If there was collusion between the major financial players, then in real terms they would have behaved like a monopolist, supplying cash at an interest equal to their marginal revenue, not their marginal cost. So to go back to the beginning of this paragraph, I’m not saying that there was any wrong doing. I just think its natural to investigate whether the collusion that seems to have taken place was natural, tacit and logical or whether there was some type of explicit agreement between some of the financial actors. Both situations are possible, but only the first is legal.

Thirdly, it was interesting to read Eichengreen's article about why the Euro will not collapse, due to market arbitrage (ie: if Greece was to leave the Eurozone, firms would know that it would devalue its currency, and as such would move their assets abroad before this, so as to not have them devalued) and to practical concerns of paying machines and cash dispensers, as well as the cost and time of producing the new currency itself.

Fourthly, one thing that is becoming more talked about is the consequence of the default for other EU member states as the interdependencies in the EU financial sectors might mean that Greece defaulting on its debt would destroy the assets of some other member states financial institutions. (As illustrated in that article: This in turn would freeze lending in EU markets as markets once more become unable to distinguish between good assets and bad ones, as they did when Lehman fell. This might cause companies to go bankrupt, because they are dependent on some type of lending from the financial sector, and to consequently fire more people. Depending on the size of these interdependencies, we could either have a little glitch or another financial crisis on our hands. Lovely...

I must say that in light of all this, and particularly in light of the stupidity of some greek politicians it might actually be better to bring in the IMF. At least that way the Greeks will stop blaming other Europeans. Moreover I don't think Germany is in the mood to help a country where a government official says something like what the Greek deputy prime minister said and the government does nothing. (Actually I wouldn't be surprised if on the eve of a German led bail out, he would be fired or retire for “personal reasons”, that most political of euphemisms…) "Let the IMF let loose the Washington consensus dogs of war"

A less interesting situation, but one which takes me back to my Varieties of Capitalism days, is the understanding of why people are protesting in the streets of Athens. On this issue, there are two interesting paths to explore here. The first one is that Greece probably lacks a substantial export sector other than its shipyards (which is not little, but probably not overwhelming). This in relation to other insights on labour force reactions to economic policy and industrial relations makes me feel that the default position for labour is protest, not refrain. If it was, then Greek workers from exporting industries would protest against the protestors (for that sake the same would apply to Danish workers when Denmark joined the Deutschmark area). The other thing is that myopic self interest really is a strong force. I mean, Greece is really in a mess. If it does not tighten its belt, it will really have to default on interest payments of its debt. This would bring about a number of painful consequences, where the little business existing in Greece would leave, thus increasing unemployment, and decreasing wages, which is basically what the EU is asking Greece to do. The difference is that business would not leave if Greece did it without defaulting on its debt. However, public functionaries don't really seem to care much about that... I may sound cruel and cold, but the truth is that Greece has no alternative. One way or another it will have to decrease wages. The choice is between the process, ie whether it wants to be coerced into doing that by basic economic mechanisms or whether it decides to do so voluntarily.

Wednesday 24 February 2010

Portugal, GDP and the ageing

From a comment posted at: http://sic.sapo.pt/programasInformacao/scripts/videoplayer.aspx?ch=plano-inclinado&videoId={FBD1FC34-B5D8-4DF4-9067-89FFC97615DD}

The dark curve is the growth of GDP, and the light blue is the growth in population of retiring age. As long as the dark curve is above the blue curve, the state can keep or increase its expenditure on pensions. Once the blue curve overtakes the dark on it must start to reconsider its fiscal expenditure or at least start taking money from somewhere else to spend it on pensions.

There's obviously a cyclical element to pension policy, whether the state is a key player in the pension system or not, caused by economic cycles.