Keeping inflation down in a Currency Union: A Policy for Germany but not for many more...

In this post I describe how monetary union without fiscal union creates a fertile ground for permanent exposure to the damage of asymmetric shocks. One side of this equation is that the economy not affected by the negative shock still benefits from the low interest. This in turn leads to high rates of inflation. This should be a concern for any country, as the cheap credit may stimulate a bubble. For a country like Germany, there's the added cost of loss of competitiveness. It hit me a while ago that there's a simple solution to this problem: Germany can unilaterally tax loans. By doing this it should increase the cost of borrowing back up, and it shouldn't be particularly hard to figure out what the tax rate would have to be, given the decrease in the interest rate, to leave the after tax interest rate of Germany untouched, in order to abort the bubble before it grew.

European Fiscal Federalism (Part 4): Institutional Framework and Credible commitments

Until now, this analysis has completely ignored who should be in charge of this redistributive policy. We have agreed that it should be the EU running the show, but which institution should be responsible for this?

European Fiscal Federalism (Part 2): OCA theory and the effects of asymmetric shocks

The first part of the comment described in the previous post belongs to a part of economics which is highly relevant for the Euro area, known as OCA (Optimum Currency Areas), their characteristics and their behaviour when faced with internally asymmetric (-like) economic shocks. Charles Wyplosz and Richard Baldwin have an extremely good book on the economics of the EU, which discusses this at length. DeGrauwe's book has a somewhat more superficial dicussion of a similar scenario, focused on the interest rate, while von Hagen and Mundschenk elaborate more thoroughly on a scenario closer to DeGrauwe's. Finally, Beetsma, Debrun and Klassen also provide some insights. The scenario discussed below is inspired by Baldwin and Wyplosz' but I've added some details.

Markets, Information, Communication and the Euro-zone Fiscal crisis

Above you can see a segment from an extremely good article by Carmassi and Micossi which can be found at VoxEU. It is about the chronology of the fiscal crisis in Greece and how miscommunication between the European Commission and Germany may have made a mess. To be honest it should be said that they do survey a very limited and rather biased sample of newspapers (Thompson-Reuters and the FT), but it is a fairly acceptable simplification from constructing a weight matrix for a larger number of newspapers that would provide a rather limited improvement of the explanation. A "must read" nonetheless!

Jean Quatremer interviews the Greek finance minister

The full article as it was published online in his blog at the website of Libération, can be found here. I've excluded the introduction. I am impressed by the apparent serenity of the Greek official. Please check ou the original website for more content. There's a particularly intriguing article about British disinformation and the Greek isles of the Aegen sea... You do however need to read French to follow the article. Alternatively run it through google translate. Here it is:

VoxEU and Policies for a Europe in a Fiscal Crisis

VoxEU, that "not-for-profit" beakon of economic thinking, has released a very good eBook on the ongoing fiscal crisis, edited by Richard Baldwin and Daniel Gros. I take the liberty of pasting the table of contents from the link above. If you have any interest in economic policy and the future of the EU, you can't miss this.

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The eBook’s Table of Contents

Completing the Eurozone rescue: What more needs to be done? Edited by Richard Baldwin and Daniel Gros

Introduction: The euro in crisis – What to do? Richard Baldwin and Daniel Gros

Drawing a line under Europe’s crisis Barry Eichengreen

The Eurozone needs a political union, or at least elements of one Paul De Grauwe

The Eurozone's levitation Charles Wyplosz

Eurozone governance: What went wrong and how to repair it Jean Pisani-Ferry

The European bicycle must accelerate Angel Ubide

What more do European governments need to do to save the Eurozone in the medium run? Thomas Mayer

The narrative outside of Europe about Europe’s fiscal crisis is wrong Avinash D. Persaud

Rethinking national fiscal policies in Europe Philip R Lane

A credible Stability and Growth Pact: Raising the bar for budgetary transparency Michael C. Burda and Stefan Gerlach

Fiscal policy at a crossroads: The need for constrained discretion Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov

Fiscal consolidation as a policy strategy to exit the global crisis Giancarlo Corsetti

German spending is not the cure Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti

The long shadow of the fall of the wall Daniel Gros

The EU and Economic reform in June 2010: Not Enough...

EU to publish bank ‘stress tests’

Europe: A tent to attend to

‘Shared sense of direction’ at EU summit

Reining in Europe’s deficits is first step - By David Cameron and Fredrik Reinfeldt

What future for the Euro after the bail out?

5 very interesting articles from www.VoxEU.org :

"Greece: The start of a systemic crisis of the Eurozone?" by Paul De Grauwe, from Leuven

"Greek lessons", by Michael Burda and Stefan Gerlach, felows of CEPR

"European Stabilisation Mechanism: Promises, realities and principles", by Charles Wyplosz, CEPR fellow

"Financial Stability beyond Greece: Making the most out of the European Stabilisation Mechanism", by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer, CEPS and Deutsch Bank respectively

"How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund", by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer, CEPS and Deutsch Bank respectively

Bailing out Greece: A great business deal!!

This note was posted as a comment on the FT, Brussels Blog at http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2010/05/mother-of-all-rescue-plans-buys-europe-time-but-can-it-work/#comments:

"Germany is all “abuzzing” about the costs of bailing out “lazy” Greeks. But how much did it cost Germany to bail out Greece? Well apparently letting Greece scare the markets and then bailing it out is a good business model. As it turns out, Germany made at least a €8.6Bn profit off it. May be even as much as €25.4Bn. How? Let’s see:

The cost of bailing out Greece was €22.4 Bn over 3 years, according to Der Spiegel. (http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,693579,00.html)

However this saved German banks from a balance sheet hole of as much as €33Bn, due to their exposure to Greek sovereign debt. (http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,693579,00.html)

It also turns out that a weak Euro, caused by Greek fiscal profligacy probably helped German exports. It is hard to say by how much, but given that exports had grown by 1% on average over the last year or so, and that they grew by 21% in March, I have generously considered that 14.81Bn out of the total 85.6Bn of German Export may have been caused by the low value of the Euro. (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f6e35528-5c1f-11df-95f9-00144feab49a.html ) Finally it seems that the DAXX regained all the losses it incurred last week. (http://markets.ft.com/ft/tearsheets/performance.asp?s=569857&ss=WSODIssue)

So I propose two estimates of the German economic profit from rescuing Greece:

If you think that my estimated effect of the low Euro is exaggerated, which it probably is, then at worse, the bail out saved German banks from incurring those losses. As such Germany made an economic profit of as much as €8.6Bn from saving Greece.

None the less the low value of the Euro must have had some impact on Germany’s. Although the effect might not have been as high as to account for a whole €14.8 Bn worth of added exports, I guess one could establish that as a decent ceiling of how good the devalued Euro might have been for Germany. If that’s so, then we have to accept that Germany might have made a total of up to €25.4Bn from rescuing Greece.

Not such a bad deal after all… "

EMF, German economy and EU procurement reform

In the following article, Tony barber of the FT asks Two questions. First, whether it is possible for Germany to

: 1) "no longer to be, in the broadest sense of the term, the EU’s paymaster", 2) "impose strict budget deficits in the Eurozone" 3)"remain the EU’s champion exporter and a model of business competitiveness, piling up vast current surpluses as a result"

and secondly, whether this is compatible with European (Economic, I assume) Stability.

Regarding the first question, I believe that this is a coherently proposed set of goals. Again, I go back to the basic open economics: Y=C+I+G+NX, and Y=C+S+T implies that I-S + X-M = T-G. Therefore it is not just possible, but in the absence of a short term disequilibrium between Investment and Savings, if Germany wants to be a big exporter it needs to have a low deficit. What better way to do that than to stop being the EU "paymaster". But is it really the pay master?

Now, the second question is much more tricky. As I said, I'm assuming that he is referring to economic stability. Now the thing one needs to keep in mind is the EU's procurement system. At the moment EU revenue has 4 main sources: VAT, customs and agricultural duties and direct country contributions, based on some GNP proportionality formula. Then there are some other smaller adhoc contributions, but nothing more tha 5-10%. This means that whoever consumes more, whoever participates in more external trade, and whoever has the largest GNP, will always be the EU's paymaster. So Germany is stuck. Even if the EU was to levy some income tax, it would still be germans paying the largest piece of the cake.

Ultimately the point is still that the whole story is a bit inflated. There is no problem with Germany not wanting to pay for greek debt. Moreover, just because it decides that the idea of a EMF is good because it spreads the monetary cost of rescue to everyone, it does not mean that suddenly Germany wants to decrease the bill it pays. I guess it only means it does not want it to increase! Germany is the biggest payer of EU but it is not the majority. It's not worth making a fuss

Portugal, GDP and the ageing

From a comment posted at: http://sic.sapo.pt/programasInformacao/scripts/videoplayer.aspx?ch=plano-inclinado&videoId={FBD1FC34-B5D8-4DF4-9067-89FFC97615DD}

The dark curve is the growth of GDP, and the light blue is the growth in population of retiring age. As long as the dark curve is above the blue curve, the state can keep or increase its expenditure on pensions. Once the blue curve overtakes the dark on it must start to reconsider its fiscal expenditure or at least start taking money from somewhere else to spend it on pensions.

There's obviously a cyclical element to pension policy, whether the state is a key player in the pension system or not, caused by economic cycles.

Lagarde seems more enlightened...

The FT has a nice little report on David Cameron and the EU, here. Moreover, here's what Damian Chalmers has to say about selective EU law. How would he deal with the incentive for time inconsistent promises from the national council and the resulting conflict of interests. The problem is the same as the one face in the implementation of the SGP in the Eurozone: The people who are expected to carry the burden of rules (ie to be punished by them) should not, alone, be the ones expected to ensure that they are well implemented. If everybody can chose what they want, than everybody will be selective. If Damian Chalmers logic applied, the Single market agenda would have never gone forward. Trade-offs are the costs of functional coordination. Without the CAP and regional policy, there would not have been enough support for the single market. I believe however that Damian Chalmers does actually have a point, although the 15 meter rule about the fireworks is not a bad idea and would do a good job at protecting people, if people are stupid enough to want to violate it, then for god's sake, do it. There's just too much human stupidity for governments to contain. However if anyone is to decide which EU laws are constitutional or not, it should be the ECJ. My EU law is a bit rusty, to say the least, but doesn't the ECJ already do this, deriving its power from article 230 TEC? If so would it not be more appropriate to just add a provision in one of these treaties, stating that EU law is supreme over national law, except on those matters whereupon it affects aspects of national culture which do not disrupt higher goals of EU law, or something like this (what I mean is to make a law which would ensure that competition in the single market is not disrupted and that EU integration is not disrupted, but that if a silly amendment is included which disrupts national cultures, if these are harmless, where these national, cultural practices are harmless there is no reason to create conflict, and impose rule from above). Thus I propose that instead of Chalmers proposal for national EU law review councils (which FYI is what parliaments already are...) the ECJ ought to fulfil its role of judicial review, possibly aided by a treaty provision which ensures that harmless national cultural practices should not be disrupted. Then again blowing up in a fire work accident does seem harmful enough. Then again, what do I know... He's a EU law specialist! Finally, Christine Lagarde, French foreign minister has very interesting insights on the financial crisis, discretionary fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers, and on the effects of competition between China and the EU (although I assume competition of an economic nature, one is left to wonder whether her comments may also apply for foreign and military affairs) and how it may stimulate stronger cooperation between EU member states.

Lisbon Treaty and the road ahead

So it turns out that the Lisbon Treaty really is going to come into force (here, here and here), probably by the end of December or January, latest in February of 2010. That's nice! It means that the decision making in the EU will be simplified, that the European Parliament will have a stronger voice in that decision making, thus reinforcing (albeit only marginally the EU electorate would say) the democratic legitimacy of the EU. This will be done by decreasing the threshold for the approval of directives (EU legislation approved by the European parliament and by the European Council, tantamount to ordering countries to pass legislation that achieves a certain end, leaving it to the countries to find out what the most appropriate way is). Countries will be given a de jure opportunity to leave the EU and individual citizens of the EU will be able to present petitions to the European Union, for the proposal of new legislation. The EU will get 1 representative for foreign policy (and security BTW...) with rather wide ranging powers, although he will not be the boggey man that Eurosceptics would make him/her out to be. He will be no where near the president of the USA, but more like his secretaries of state or defence. Nonetheless there will be nothing resembling an imperial presidency of the EU, along USA lines. Indeed, the role of the permanent president of the council of the EU is still very much unspecified and there seems to only be some consensus that his or her influence will be shaped by whoever becomes the first permanent (only 2 and half years mandate renewable only once). Thus if a Blair type becomes the first president, he will try to shape it into some wide ranging position. If however a Juncker type would take over it would be a more discrete political role, building consensus and setting the agenda, which would be a good idea. As a matter of fact all that this treaty really does is to give more coherence to European institutions, and decrease the noise around the voice of Europe (by simplifying decision making and defining the division of labour within the EU better, once we'll know what the president does). Member states are still able to make a fuss, to posture and more importantly, to defend their constituents' interest.However, and until the next generation of EU treaties comes along, they will not be able to freeze European integration; at least not without a far reaching support for their position. Hopefully, by providing this new framework for decision making it will allow the EU to be a more determined government. Hopefully by decreasing the threshold for legislating it will make the EU more responsive to political concerns. "Hopefully", because there's a ton of things to take care of and the end of this constitutional soap opera eliminates a most distracting excuse. As Barber puts it, now is the time to turn to the daily business. Here is a prior discussion and beneath are some ideas: Fiscal policy - The SGP (stability and growth pact which regulates the size of deficits <=3%) is likely to be a rather deficient tool, although only the recovery from this economic crisis will tell. How can the EU sort its fiscal policy out? It needs to decrease fiscal deficits, while allowing for a system where in the face of economic contraction, it allows for deficits to rise in order to permit tax smoothing. The present SGP permits such a thing to happen, but it has three problems and one advantage: first, it is likely to be too lax, there are too many excuses for running a deficit. Secondly, it is a system where the states police themselves. For anyone who knows human nature and anyone who's studied delegation (eg: to central banks) or principal agent problems, it is obvious that humans very easily tend to follow an atomistic, myopic short termist behaviour, and as a whole or as a group we should not be trusted to regulate ourselves, as there will always be an incentive to break promises ex post. Moreover due to alliances in the EcoFin committee it has created an environment where legislation is not applied equally and where smaller countries endure and larger countries do what they please. Finally, the present arrangement of the SGP does not have much in the way of (European) parliamentary supervision. This may be right (given that national budgets are scrutinised by their respective national parliaments) or not (given the fact that there are externalities and spillover effects from one country's budget to the next), however somebody ought to seat down the economic thinking heads and figure out what could be done to make this process better and then someone ought to seat down the political thinking heads and ask them to figure out what the best course of action in order to approve that preferred process. The advantage that the SGP has is that it is flexible (enormously so). At the moment this has been good. Keynesian economics are very useful during a crisis. However, once the economy picks up it will be interesting to see whether the EcoFin committee will be able or even willing to coerce member states to decrease their deficits. A concluding remark on fiscal policy should say that in the present context of recovery economics it is better to run a little too high deficits than to run too little ones. Pollution - I know little about this, other than that if we don't decrease carbon emissions we'll cook ourselves to death like frogs and that if we don't find a sustainable and reliable way to diversify our sources of enegy, Russia will eventually reprivatise it's industries along national lines and we won't be able to do anything about it except pay the natural gas bill at the end of the year. (this is a very far fetched scenario until Russia develops anything close to a sustainable form of economic growth and development based on anything else than exports of raw materials) Foreign policy - Will the HRUFAS be able to create a better more coherent and far reaching foreign policy for the EU? Will there be a coherent approach to USA, Latin America, China, India, and (most doubtfully) to Russia? Will some countries prefer to abandon their diplomatic missions abroad and delegate this task to the EEAS? Or will it become more and more apparent that the national diplomatic missions are fundamental lobbies for the maintenance of contracts and export agreements from smaller European nations to non EU states. Will this mean that the nations will further decrease their diplomatic missions and specialise them in their trade targets? On another topic, how loud will the HRUFAS be in the defence of Human Rights? Security and Defence policy - What will happen to European military and security cooperation? One of the biggest problems is that different EU states have different weapons and military gear. This means that in the unlikely even that we go to war, French and British pilots will not be able to fly each others planes, or operate eachothers tanks. It decreases the size of the market and thus the economies of scale that can be derived from it. This is caused by the fact that military industries are still considered to be strategic national industries and that despite their security cooperation, European states still want to be able to develop armament independently of the USA and of each other. The biggest military contractors are german, british and belgian companies which face some competition from Belgium (I think) and Sweden ( or scandinavian conglomerate). Moreover, the majority of these industries have a monopoly-monopsony type of relationship with their national governments. Will we finally get a proper European procurement? Only if one way or another, these industries are given some protection, ie only if the EU and the national industries are able to come to an agreement where profits are not threatened and job losses are minimised, while countries still feel comfortable and safe in their defence. There is thus a triangle of interests, which must be protected in order for military integration to happen: National security - profits to investors in the arms industry - workers in this industry. What will the HRUFAS do? We shall see...