I found this blog post and couldn't let it go by. It was posted by Matt Persson, a regular contributor with his own blog at euobserver.com. I am posting it here for fear that it may be erazed in the future. It is a transcript from a homonimous article of Le Monde. If, as according to the article it is a reliable account of what went on, then one should be really concerned... On the other hand, Berlusconi's contributions are as ridiculous at the EU level as anywhere else!
Tuesday, 21 September 2010
Sunday, 19 September 2010
European Fiscal Federalism (Part 5): Democratic deficit, Budgetary empowerment, institutional competition and shifting the status quo
In the previous posts ( 1, 2, 3) I have described the economic logics for an EU fiscal policy and the political economy argument for delegation of such powers to the European Commission (4). In this context, I would like to highlight the recent report that a group of European Socialists are lobbying their party to pursue US style primaries to appoint their candidate for the 2015 European Commission Presidency. There is an equivalently irrefutable logic behind this type of process, which has been explored by Hix and Follesdal in a 2006 article on the EU's democratic deficit. This initiative could also be the beginning of something along the lines of the Wallstrom candidacy imagined by Hix.
Friday, 17 September 2010
European Fiscal Federalism (Part 4): Institutional Framework and Credible commitments
Wednesday, 15 September 2010
European Fiscal Federalism (Part 3): Pigouvian taxation, and redistribution - Externalities, mobile assets, and euro interest rates
So far, I’ve been describing the economic logic for fiscal federalism. However I have not qualified it. It's all nice and easy to argue that we need to tax the richest and subsidise the poorest, but how do you do this? Which pockets should the EU reach into and what should it pay for?
In the next lines I propose the following Euro-level fiscal tools : (1)Taxes on mobile factors that cause negative externalities, (2)an Income tax, and the maintenance of a (3)common education policy as well as a (4)common defence policy, with a tendency for expansionary military R&D expenditure during recessions. Finally I also argue in favour of (5)the establishment of an European Monetary Fund (EMF) to switch from cooperation to coordination of euro-area fiscal policies. This would be the best tool to keep and improve the theoretically good monitoring devices created by the SGP, while replacing its very ineffective legalistic procedures, in order to improve fiscal stability across the board.
I believe these are the necessary tools for the EU to minimise its risks of suffering from asymmetric shocks, while endowing it with the policy tools to deal with them, should they arise, as they inevitably will. They may however not be sufficient...
Thursday, 9 September 2010
European Fiscal Federalism (Part 2): OCA theory and the effects of asymmetric shocks
Saturday, 4 September 2010
EU Financial Reform: First steps
I've been trying to post something for a while about recent fiscal developments at the EU level and suggestions of a EU tax. However it's taken a lot of time as I keep on getting distracted.
In the mean time some tentative words on the agreement reached recently on EU reform, between the Commission, Parliament and the Council. Some extracts below from...